

5. SECURITY STUDIES

SECURITY POLICY OF THE PRESIDENTS OF POLAND (1990-2017)

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ABSTRACT

Protecting the sovereignty and state security is one of the key responsibilities of the president of Poland, emphasized in all constitutions from the moment of restoration of the office in 1989. Although all politicians who held the state's highest office used the competences granted to them in this area, they did it to different extents and with different distribution of emphases, in more or less efficient cooperation with the council of ministers.

The article offers an overview and analysis of the declarations made, positions held and decisions taken in the broadly understood sphere of security, which formed the security policy of the presidents of Poland. Different elements of the policy were analyzed, which were considered as key ones from the point of view of the state, at different points of the discussed period. Naturally, the choice is subjective, yet it is quite obvious in many respects.

The article is based on open, commonly available sources. They include the election programs of the candidates for the office of president of Poland, official positions and delivered speeches, press articles, scientific papers and monographs, biographies and autobiographies of the presidents. The analysis conducted in this article has been based on a mixed qualitative-quantitative approach.

KEYWORDS

President, Third Polish Republic, security policy, Polish Armed Forces, state security, national security.

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Introduction – the problem of competences of the president of Poland in the area of security

The article covers the period from January 1, 1990 until the present moment (for the purposes of the article, December 31, 2017 was adopted as the end date). During this period, presidents' competences

were defined in three constitutions. In the years 1990-1992, it was the revised constitution of Polish People's Republic (Polish acronym: *PRL*), in the years 1992-97 – the so-called Little Constitution, and from 1997

onwards – the Constitution of Poland. Each of the said documents provided different definitions of the scope of responsibilities and competences of the head of the country in the discussed period.

The 1976 Constitution of PRL was subjected to a significant revision in the spring of 1989 (the so-called April amendment¹). The country's name was not changed at that time (this was done by the amendment of December 1989²), but the office of the president was reintroduced into the political system of the country (PRL). Under article 32 of the constitution amended in April, the president of PRL was "the highest representative of the Polish state for internal relations and international relations". His tasks included ensuring that the constitution is complied with, protecting the sovereignty and state security, the integrity and indivisibility of the country's territory, and compliance with international political and economic treaties (at that time, this meant preservation of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon.) He was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (first of PRL, and then, after the December amendment, of the Republic of Poland (RP). He was also to head the National Defense Committee (*Komitet Obrony Kraju*) - an entity competent in matters of state security and defense (established back in 1959 and known mainly for the role it played during the martial law³). Subparagraph "l" of the same article, among the competences of the president listed also the president's powers to introduce a martial law or a state of emergency, and announce mobiliza-

tion. If the Parliament did not operate, and the circumstances so required, he made decisions regarding the state of war and appointing the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces. Until their liquidation⁴, the president also "exercised supervision over the national councils" (subparagraph "h", art. 32). He had the power to dissolve the Parliament, if it failed to appoint the government, adopt the budget, or if it adopted an act preventing the president from exercising his constitutional powers. He could also preside over the council of ministers convened "for matters of special importance" (the term 'cabinet council' will only appear in the constitution of 1997). He did not appoint the government (this was within the powers of the Parliament), but the process required consultation with the president. He had the right to nominate candidates for ministers of the so-called 'power ministries' (Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs).

Contrary to the provisions of the two constitutions that followed, under the April amendment, the president was elected for a 6-year term of office by the National Assembly rather than the citizens. The only president elected according to these rules was Wojciech Jaruzelski. Another constitutional amendment⁵, of September 1990, stipulated that the president would be elected by the nation in a general election, for a 5-year term of office, with one re-election possible. However, this act also stipulated that the term of office of the president elected by the National Assembly would be shortened. The new election was to take place within two months, and so it happened. Lech Wałęsa, the legendary leader of Solidarity who was elected president in

¹ Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, Dz.U. 1989 Nr 19, poz. 101.

² Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, Dz.U. 1989 nr 75, poz. 444.

³ NDF was responsible for implementation of Marshall Law in 1981. The head of NDF – gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski – thanks to new entitlements was de facto a superior commander of Polish Armed Forces. (see also: Kowalski L. (2011), *Komitet Obrony Kraju* (MON – PZPR – MSW), Warszawa, p. 636).

⁴ Ustawa z dnia 8 marca 1990 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. 1990 nr 16, poz. 94

⁵ Ustawa z dnia 27 września 1990 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Dz.U. 1990 nr 67, poz. 397.

that election, led to the adoption of the so-called Little Constitution – a transition document between the amended constitution of PRL and the new constitution.

The “Little” Constitution of October 17, 1992⁶ (a legal act, which legalized selected constitutional solutions), stipulated in art. 28 that the President of Poland is the highest representative of the Polish State in internal and international relations. The president was to ensure that the Constitution of Poland is complied with, to protect the sovereignty and state security, the integrity and indivisibility of the country’s territory, and to ensure that international agreements are respected. Art. 32 additionally empowered the president to exercise “general leadership in international relations”, and art. 34 referred to “general leadership in the field of external and internal state security”. Like in the amended Constitution of PRL, the President was the supreme commander of the Polish Armed Forces. In consultation with the Minister of National Defense, he appointed and dismissed the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, and, following the request of the Ministry of National Defense - the deputies of the Chief of the General Staff, commanders of the particular types of Armed Forces, and commanders of military districts. He appointed the Chief Commander for the time of war. He also had the power to introduce martial law, a state of emergency, and announce mobilization. He could convene the council of ministers with himself as chair, and approve (art. 61) the appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defense, and Minister of Internal Affairs. This power was the cause of many conflicts between the president and prime

minister when Lech Wałęsa was in office. A completely new constitution of Poland was adopted only in 1997, thanks to the efforts of Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who succeeded Lech Wałęsa in office.

The Constitution of Poland of April 2, 1997, which so far has defined the responsibilities and powers of four presidents (Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Lech Kaczyński, Bronisław Komorowski and Andrzej Duda), in article 126, section 2 stipulates that “the President of Poland ensures compliance with the Constitution, protects the sovereignty and state security as well as the integrity and indivisibility of the country’s territory”. Art. 133 of the Constitution further stipulates that the President is the representative of the state “in external relations”.

The general constitutional norm referring to the question of protecting the sovereignty and state security as well as the integrity and indivisibility of the country’s territory was explained in the act of November 21, 1967 on the general defense obligation towards Poland (later subjected to multiple amendments). Pursuant to article 4a section 1 of the act, the President:

- approves, following the request of the Prime Minister, the strategy of national security;
- issues, following the request of the Prime Minister, by way of regulation, the Political and Strategic Defense Directive of Poland and other executive documents for the strategy of national security;
- approves, following the request of the Council of Ministers, plans of national exercise of the defense system, and supervises its course;
- decides, following the request of the Prime Minister, about the introduction or change of a particular status of the country’s defense readiness;

⁶ Ustawa Konstytucyjna z dnia 17 października 1992 r. o wzajemnych stosunkach między władzą ustawodawczą i wykonawczą Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o samorządzie terytorialnym, Dz.U. 1992 nr 84, poz. 426.

- may request, from all entities of public administration, the government and local administration, entrepreneurs, heads of other organizational units and social organizations, information of importance for the security and defense of the country;
- initiates and is the patron of actions promoting patriotic and defense-oriented attitudes in the society.

General competences regarding protecting the sovereignty and state security as well as the integrity and indivisibility of the country's territory oblige the President to analyze and assess the potential threats, and launch legally permissible actions in order to counteract these threats. Therefore, depending on the nature and degree of an external threat to the country, the President may order, following the request of the Prime Minister, general or partial mobilization and usage of the Armed Forces for the defense of Poland (art. 136 of the Constitution).

Another important prerogative of the head of the country, connected with ensuring state security, is described in art. 234 of the Constitution, which stipulates as follows: "If, during martial law, the Parliament is unable to convene in session, the President of Poland, following the request of the Council of Ministers, shall issue regulations with the power of acts in the scope of, and within the limits stipulated in art. 228 sections 3-5. These regulations are subject to the approval of the Parliament at its nearest session". Moreover, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, the President of Poland:

- grants – following the request of the Minister of National Defense - military ranks described in the acts;
- following the request of the Council of Ministers, may introduce martial law in a part or the whole territory of the country;
- following the request of the Council of Ministers – may introduce, for a speci-

fied period not longer than 90 days, a state of emergency in a part or the whole territory of the country. While it lasts, following the request of the Prime Minister, he may decide to use the Polish Armed Forces in order to restore the normal functioning of the country, if the forces and means used up to that point have been exhausted.

Competences of the President of Poland regarding his being the supreme commander of the Armed Forces are described in the act on the general defense obligation towards Poland. And so, the President of Poland, as the Commander of the Armed Forces, following the request of the Minister of National Defense, defines the main development directions of the Armed Forces and their preparation for defending the country (art. 5 subparagraph 1), and can take part in the briefings of the managerial staff of the Ministry of National Defense and the Armed Forces of Poland (art. 5 subparagraph 2).

Furthermore, following the request of the Council of Ministers or the Prime Minister, he decides about sending the Armed Forces abroad to take part in an armed conflict, or in order to strengthen the national forces or the allied forces, for a peace mission, in order to prevent acts of terror, or their consequences. For the time of war, he appoints the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces, announces general mobilization and usage of the Armed Forces for the defense of Poland.

The President has also powers to ensure the country's internal security. If using the units and sub-units of the Police proves to be insufficient, he can decide, following the request of the Prime Minister, to use the units and sub-units of the Armed Forces of Poland to aid the Police. He can convene the Cabinet Council (it is the first time when the constitution directly applies this term to

the council of ministers holding a session with the president as chair).

The comparison of the three constitutions in the area of the president's competences for ensuring national security does not reveal significant differences. The key provisions (general responsibility for internal and external security and foreign policy, influence the functioning of the Armed Forces, competences connected with states of emergency, or the relation with the council of ministers) do not differ considerably, even if in the 1997 Constitution the president ultimately lost the power to appoint the heads of the 'power ministries'. All three documents assume that the two executive entities (the president and the council of ministers) will cooperate in efforts aiming to ensure security.

Presidents of the Third Polish Republic

If we assume that on 1 January 1990, after the Constitution changed the country's name from Polish People's Republic (*PRL*) to the Republic of Poland (*RP*), the Third Polish Republic began, during that time, 6 politicians held the office of president:

- Wojciech Jaruzelski (1989-1990),
- Lech Wałęsa (1990-1995),
- Aleksander Kwaśniewski (1995-2005),
- Lech Kaczyński (2005-2010),
- Bronisław Komorowski (2010-2015),
- Andrzej Duda (2015-).

They were/are diametrically different people, in many respects. Wojciech Jaruzelski, general of the Polish People's Army (Polish acronym: *LWP*) became the president following the agreement between the government and the opposition at the Round Table. He was aware of the limitations involved in the situation. Becoming the president was the crowning of his political career; he tried to use the office to improve his image – his evolution from a martial law dictator to

a politician enjoying broad support of all the circles in Poland. He stayed in office for a year, from 19 July 1989 to 22 December 1990.

Lech Wałęsa – the legendary leader of "Solidarity" – moved to the Belvedere (the official residence of the President of Poland) accompanied by huge expectations that he would unite the divided political scene, mitigate the difficult consequences of the economic reforms introduced by the government of Leszek Balcerowicz, and complete the political and social transformation of the country. However, he did not meet the expectations, he supported political divisions rather than mitigating them, tried to personally control the works of the parliament and the government, which he threatened to dissolve if they did not agree with his opinion. This resulted in early parliamentary elections and the communists coming to power in 1992. Three years later, he lost the battle for reelection with their leader, a young politician of the Democratic Left Alliance (Polish acronym: *SLD*), Aleksander Kwaśniewski. He stayed in office for a full term, from 22 December 1990 to 22 December 1995.

When Aleksander Kwaśniewski took office, he was 41 years old. In the past, he was a member of the Polish United Workers Party (Polish acronym: *PZPR*), and a minister in the governments of Zbigniew Messner and Mieczysław Rakowski. He co-founded Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (Polish acronym: *SdRP*) - the successor of *PZPR*, and *SLD*. His victory over the legend of "Solidarity" ultimately crowned the earlier parliamentary victory of the Left, showing that five years after the fall of communism the society had no problem with democratically giving power to the post-communists. As the only president Kwaśniewski was not only reelected, but also beat his rivals in the first round. During his 10 years in office Poland became

a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union.

Lech Kaczyński took office in 2005, in the atmosphere of diversion on the Left caused by the scandals revealed while the Left was in power: his election victory over the fragmented Left and the leader of the Civic Platform, Donald Tusk, coincided with the victory of the party from which he originated, the Law and Justice, in the parliamentary elections. His time in office was marked by a difficult co-habitation with the government formed by his election rival. He died on April 10, 2010 in the government's plane crash in Smoleńsk. Along with Wojciech Jaruzelski, he was one of the two presidents who did not stay in office for a full term.

Bronisław Komorowski moved to the presidential palace as a Speaker of the Sejm, replacing the president who died when in office. This former minister of national defense concentrated his interests and actions around the armed forces (the reform of the system of command, the Komorowski Doctrine). He surrendered the other areas to the government representing the same political option.

Andrzej Duda quite unexpectedly defeated B. Komorowski who ran for the re-election. When elected, he was 43 years old, hence the comparisons to A. Kwaśniewski. Duda was expected to be highly active in Poland's internal and foreign policies. However, the practice observed by the middle of his term suggests that he handed over the initiative and executive powers in the above-mentioned fields to the council of ministers and the minister of national defense.

Selected aspects of the security policy of the presidents of Poland

We will define the security policy as an element of the country's policy in the field of the practical actions of the executive authorities regarding the creation and usage of the defense potential for the purposes and tasks resulting from the tenets of the security policy⁷. In other words, this will be the totality of actions undertaken by the state and its institutions in order to ensure state security, as a whole, and security of the country's citizens, as a group and as individuals. Security policy should not only address the emerging risks and threats, but also predict them before they emerge, and take advantage of the chances and challenges offered by the international circles and internal circumstances in the aspect of security.

Considering both the constitutional competences of the presidents, and their practical actions, including relations with the other executive entity, as well as the external circumstances in which they worked, it can be noticed that each of the presidents had a different perception of his role in the area of state security. The key problems tackled are contained in Table 1.

⁷ Słownik podstawowych terminów bezpieczeństwa państwa (1994), p. 63.

PRESIDENT	International security policy (alliances, foreign operations)	Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland	Internal security, the system of justice	Other aspects of security: social, political, economic, health etc.
Wojciech Jaruzelski	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintaining Poland's membership in Warsaw Pact and Comecon; - Maintaining the old alliances as security guarantee. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The army as an instrument for staying in power in a situation of potential upheaval 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintaining control over internal formations through the appointed minister of internal affairs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No specific recommendations
Lech Wałęsa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preserving the western border of the country (agreement with West Germany); - Leaving the Warsaw Pact and Comecon; - Removing the Red Army forces from the territory of Poland; - Applying for accession to NATO and EU; - Concept of NATO-bis and EU-bis; - Involvement in the UN operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Their stronger submission to the president than the minister of national defense (the so-called Drawsko Dinner); - Apolitical army, ban on soldiers' membership in political parties. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pay rises for the uniformed forces - postulate; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic security as the category which suffered most during the transformation - postulate of slowing down economic reforms;
Aleksander Kwaśniewski	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Republic of Poland 2000 Security strategy, the Republic of Poland 2003 National security strategy - The NATO and EU accessions; - Involvement in the operation in Iraq and Afghanistan; - Involvement in maintaining the pro-West orientation of Ukraine (The Orange Revolution). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Expeditionary forces, partly professional, but without full suspension of conscription; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 8 cabinet councils 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Budget vetoed due to lack of tax increase (citizens' economic security)
Lech Kaczyński	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Republic of Poland 2007 National security strategy; - Involvement of Poland and other EU countries in the war between Russia and Georgia; - Supporting the pro-west orientation in Ukraine; - Project of building ballistic missile defense in Poland; - The Lisbon Treaty; - Maintaining high military involvement, first in Iraq, then in Afghanistan. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fully conscripted army, target numbers: 150 thousand, ready to defend the country and engage in allied operations; - Creation of special forces as the fourth type of forces; - Opposition against reduction of involvement in allied operations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 4 cabinet councils 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The GUAM project (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) - energy security.

Bronisław Komorowski	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – The white paper on the national security of the republic of Poland; – The Republic of Poland 2014 Security strategy; – Maintaining active presence in NATO and EU; – The NATO VJTF – Pursuing military presence of the Alliance on the territory of the Republic of Poland. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Reform of the of system of command of the Republic of Poland military forces; – The Komorowski Doctrine: 1.95% of the annual GDP allocated for the army 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 3 cabinet councils 	
Andrzej Duda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – NATO summit in Poland; – Presence of the allied forces on the Republic of Poland territory - implementation; – Discussion about the “quality” of the EU membership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Creation of the Territorial Defense Force (WOT) - supporting the project of the Ministry of National Defense 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – “Deubekizacja” of the services (removing former security police workers); – reform of the courts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Migration policy - a “no” to Muslim refugees

Source: Based on:

Nałęcz T (2016), *Strażnicy Rzeczypospolitej*, Kuźniar R. (2001), *Polska polityka bezpieczeństwa 1989-2000*, Głajcar R., Migalski M. (ed.) (2006), *Prezydent w Polsce po 1989 roku*, W. Reszczyński W. (1995), *Wygrać prezydenta, Wybory prezydenckie 1995, 2000, 2005. Programy kandydatów (1996, 2001, 2007)*, Kwaśniewski A. (2000), *Dom wszystkich* Polska, Kwaśniewski A. (2001), *Po prostu lubię ludzi*, Dudek A. (2004), *Reglamentowana rewolucja, Rozkład dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988-1990*, Dudek A. (2016), *Historia polityczna Polski 1989-2015*, Dudek A. (2002), *Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej 1989-2001*, Roszkowski W. (2017), *Historia Polski 1914-2015*, Maruszkin M., Szaladziński K. (2016), *Krzysztof Skubiszewski i dyplomacja czasów przełomu*.

Internet sources (present and archived): www.prezydent.pl, www.bbn.gov.pl, www.sejm.gov.pl, <http://www.skubi.net/nato.html>

Election campaign materials

Without a doubt, the actions undertaken by the presidents were determined by the circumstances under which they were to lead the country. During the whole period discussed here, they were mostly the events that resulted from the international situation and the position of Poland in the global jigsaw puzzle. Importantly, despite the already indicated differences, in the period of the 28 analyzed years, it is hard to find any case of radical withdrawal from the pro-West, democratic line or direction that based the country's security on strong alliances and an efficient, successful state. What is important, taking into account the position the president holds in the Polish

political system and his co-dependence on the Council of Ministers in the efficient decision-making process, leaving aside exceptions, cohabitation in the issues essential for the security was model one. One could risk saying that out of all types of policies, the security policy in the Third Republic of Poland was the most stable and gave rise to fewest political disputes.

For Wojciech Jaruzelski, the office of president, as well as he as the appointed president, was a guarantee that the agreement reached by the “Round Table” would not give “Solidarity” a dominant position over the Polish United Worker's Party, which was ensured by executing control

of the ministries of power in the government headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The gained position was also to enable maintaining the current direction of the country, in particular, respecting the treaties and alliances in which Poland remained despite the June elections (officially, the country left the Warsaw Pact upon its dissolution in 1991, and Comecon a month earlier), with the Russian troops still in the country⁸. Upon taking the office, on the one hand, the general had ambitions to appear as widely supported but on the other hand, he did not want to interfere with the existing *status quo*, at least not more than it was necessary. He hoped that he would be able to stay in office for the whole term, the reforms initiated by the "Round Table" would be cosmetic and that "Solidarity," carrying the burden of governing and costly social changes, would lose its momentum⁹. Despite that, it needs to be noted that until he left the office in December 1990, Jaruzelski did not block, in any essential way, the discussions "Solidarity" had about leaving the alliances and the plans to withdraw the Soviet troops, also, he did not negate - at least not officially - the pro-West reorientation of the country. At best, he only delayed it. As regards the army, in addition to being the power capable of carrying out the country's defense tasks, he saw it as the tool for maintaining order inside Poland. He did not treat the reforms initiated by Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government as a threat to the economic security of the citizens and did not refer to them in such a context in any of his official speeches. Worth noting is the fact that his surrendering of power was peaceful - from the moment he agreed to the amendment of the constitution that in-

roduced general and practically immediate presidential elections, to the very moment he left the Belvedere building in December 1990. The objectives and the practical implementation of Wojciech Jaruzelski's security policy are strictly military and based on a political, military and economic alliance with the Soviet Union.

When Lech Wałęsa took office, he was hugely burdened with social expectations. However, these were neither connected with the real competences of the president (the actions he was capable of executing), nor with the most important - from the country's security point of view - geopolitical changes taking place at the international level but rather with the economic situation of the nation after beginning the implementation of Leszek Balcerowicz's reforms. Judging by the political programs of the presidential candidates, it is clear how big the problem was back in 1990: they all speak about helping and bringing relief to the citizens, omitting the fact that the presidential office gives no powers to do so, except for vetoing the solutions proposed by the government.¹⁰ Lech Wałęsa's program was not dealing too much with the issues of "hard" security. It only stated that Poland should leave the old alliances and strive for new ones, offer the uniformed services wage increases, verify the officers and improve the courts. As the president, Wałęsa was remembered as the person who was rather argumentative, in continuous dispute with the government, but Krzysztof Skubiszewski, who at the time was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and as such was "doomed" to be in frequent contact with the president admits that despite some rare cases, like when he agreed to negotiate the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Poland with Boris Yeltsin without prior ar-

⁸ The last soviet soldier left Poland on September 17, 1993.

⁹ See also: Kowalski L., *Generał ze skazą*, Nałęcz T., *Strażnicy Rzeczypospolitej*, Kowal P., Cieślak M., Jaruzelski: życie paradoksalne.

¹⁰ *Wybory prezydenckie 1995. Programy kandydatów (1996)*, p. 78

rangements and filed a proposal for NATO-bis in Germany, Wałęsa never questioned any indications or decisions of the head of the MFA, and always carefully listened to what he said.¹¹ Foreign security policy was excluded from the ongoing dispute between the president and government, and good cooperation in this regard resulted in the official dissolving of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon and the complete, though lasting more than one year, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.¹²

One 5-year long term turned out to be too short to fully implement this great project initiated by the leader of "Solidarity", aimed at reversing the alliances and making Poland a full member of NATO and the EU. Wałęsa managed "only" to officially state that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership is one of the priorities, on September 1, 1993 and start building a bridge towards full membership – the Partnership for Peace. Before it happened, annoyed with the slow decision-making process of the Western countries as regards accepting the possibility of expanding the Alliance, he announced, during his visit to Germany in March 1992, a concept of NATO-bis¹³ and EEC-bis, which had not been agreed on with the MFA. He also signed an order on using the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in the UN operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Considering the constitutional prerogatives as well as the behavior of his predecessor, for the president, impact on the army was one of the obvious attributes of his power and his disputes with the Ministry

of National Defense that was formally executing army command in times of peace. The most acute manifestation of the conflict was the so-called Drawsko Dinner¹⁴ – a meeting the president had with the generals without their civil supervisors whom he harshly criticized and ordered a voting of the army representatives on the minister's dismissal. It was not only a violation of the constitution but it also undermined the role of civil control over the army and was clearly in conflict with the effort the president declared: to de-politicize the armed forces.

The objectives and the practical implementation of Lech Wałęsa's security policy are geopolitical, international and focused on making a radical change as well as precise (which is significant, when taking into account the chaotic personality of the president) implementation thereof. From the dissolving of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon to the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the official announcement of the efforts to become a member of NATO. Without Wałęsa's personality and position, those processes could have been much slower and more frenzy.

In 1995, by taking the possibility of reelection away from Lech Wałęsa, Aleksander Kwaśniewski deprived the legend of "Solidarity" of the chances to consume the successes he had started during the transformation. Despite some concerns, he did not change the route initiated by his predecessor. At the end of his first term, Poland became a member of NATO in 1999, and at the end of his second term - in 2004 - the country joined the European Union. Those two most important events in the history of the Polish security policy in its strategic aspect ensured political consensus between

¹¹ Maruszkin M., Szaładziński K. (2016), Krzysztof Skubiszewski i dyplomacja czasów przełomu, p. 101

¹² Strzelczyk J. (2002), Ucieczka ze Wschodu. Polska polityka zagraniczna w latach 1989-1993, p. 84

¹³ The idea assumed the creation of a quasi-system of common security under NATO's leadership for its members – primarily Central European countries and Ukraine. This safety zone was to fill in the void in the area and make it possible for further countries to join NATO in the future.

¹⁴ Dudek A. (2013), Historia polityczna Polski 1989-2012, p. 305.

the core powers in the country for a long time. The route of changes started in 1989 was obvious. Once the great challenges were achieved, discrepancies concerning executing the country's membership in those organizations, particularly in NATO, started to spring. The first example was the discussion about the level of engagement in the second Gulf War started in March 2003. Polish troops were sent out for a stabilization operation by the order of the president, they were not sent to war (that required the Sejm's consent), after a parliamentary debate. This decision gave rise to many years of intensive, strong involvement of the Polish Armed Forces in operations outside Poland (first and foremost the Polish Military Contingent in Iraq and Afghanistan). Polish army began to be called expeditionary (almost 5% of its manpower stayed permanently outside the country). A. Kwaśniewski backed up all decisions of the government and the Ministry of National Defense in this regard, proving that Poland deserved to be a member of NATO, and in the meantime building his own position in the opinion of the allies. At the end of his second term, he got involved in supporting the Orange Revolution and its leaders: Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko.

The objectives and the practical implementation of Aleksander Kwaśniewski's security policy are strategic - completing the transformation and building the position of Poland as a reliable partner of the West in NATO and EU's structures. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that by vetoing governmental measures (tax increase), he appealed to the economic security of the citizens.

In contrast to his predecessors, Lech Kaczyński was the first president of the Republic of Poland who was not faced with the great challenges upon taking office. It seemed that, for the first time, the respon-

sibility of the president shall be to manage security, continue the pro-West orientation and actively participate in international operations. This expectation was reflected in, for example, the new vision of the armed forces announced by the president in Autumn 2006, completely professional and ultimately reaching the number of 150 thousand with expeditionary capabilities and strong potential inside the country. Appointing an independent type of armed forces, the special forces, he showed a new focus on the contemporary field of battle. Similarly important was the project of deploying elements of the American anti-missile shield in Poland that eventually failed to be completed due to the change of presidents in the US¹⁵.

However, the beginning of the term brought completely new challenges, including particularly the ones in the area of energy security. The Russian-Ukrainian energy crisis in winter 2006 showed clearly that Poland is not a safe country in this respect (in January, the supplies of Russian gas to Poland dropped on average by 14%)¹⁶. The president was personally involved in the operations that aimed to change the situation, such as the purchase of Mažeikiai refinery in Lithuania or GUAM project¹⁷ – Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, a regional organization of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova with the purpose of ensuring energy security with as little dependency on the Russian Federation as possible. Those measures, just like his later involvement in

¹⁵ Chrośnicki M., Gruszczyk A. (ed.) (2008), *Wpływ tarczy antyrakietowej na pozycję międzynarodową Polski*, Kraków 2008, preface.

¹⁶ Ruszel M. (2015), *Wpływ rosyjsko-ukraińskich kryzysów gazowych na politykę energetyczną UE – ujęcie teoretyczne* (49-57), Pressto, Poznań, DOI: 10.14746/pp.2015.20.2.4

¹⁷ Wróblewski Ł., *GUAM – Organizacja na Rzecz Demokracji i Rozwoju*, Portal Spraw Zagranicznych, <http://www.psz.pl/168-archiwum/lukasz-wroblewski-guam-organizacja-na-rzecz-demokracji-i-rozwoju>

defending Georgia in its conflict with Russia in August 2008 in South Ossetia, set forth the axis of his presidential mandate in the context of international security: as a steady member of the EU and NATO, Poland was to be the leader among the CEE countries and promote their views on the relations with the East in both organizations. This included, in particular, supporting such countries as Ukraine or Georgia in their resistance against the gradually more and more offensive Russian policy. It was an ambitious vision, quite right though impossible to be implemented due to the attitude of both: the main Western members of NATO or the EU, but also the weakness and instability in the Eastern countries which were supposed to be supported in strengthening democracy and leaving the sphere of influence. The offensive policy of the Russian Federation that was not met with a sufficiently firm response in the West also contributed to the collapse of the concept. An internal dispute with Donald Tusk, who was appointed Prime Minister in 2007 and whose view on those issues was similar to the Western views, made Lech Kaczyński quite lonely when it came to his actions and measures. His death in the plane crash near Smoleńsk in 2010 *in fact* ended Poland efforts to become the leader of the EU eastern policy.

The objectives and the practical implementation of Lech Kaczyński's security policy had the ambition to make Poland a strategic country that builds the EU eastern policy in response to the observed offensive against the countries of the former Eastern block. Continuing the country's involvement in the NATO and EU stabilization operations outside Poland, acting in favor of installing the American missile system in Poland and, possibly in the future, NATO troops as well (achieved finally almost 10 years la-

ter) was to offer the Republic of Poland strategic security guarantees and entitle the country to develop policy in the region.

Bronisław Komorowski moved in the Presidential Palace on April 10, 2010, afternoon, as the Speaker of the Sejm who was the acting president. He received presidential mandate after the campaign that took place in August 2010 in the shadow of Smoleńsk. During the campaign, security issues were not in the center of attention. In fact, his main rival, Jarosław Kaczyński, fed the voters with some messages mitigating the anti-Russian stance in his speech titled: to the Russian Friends given symbolically on May 9¹⁸. One of the first security-related issues that Bronisław Komorowski had to face was the post-crash¹⁹ travel safety of the most important persons in the country, and appointing new commanders to fill in for those who died near Smolensk.

By the order of President Komorowski, the National Security Bureau, a public institution assisting the president of Poland in executing his tasks related to security and defense, completed an audit of the security situation in Poland and provided recommendations for its further development in the "The White Paper on the Security of the Republic of Poland". However, its relevance was more academic than practical, it showed that the security subsystems were functioning quite efficiently, and that the system was not capable as a whole. Of all the recommendations, only one reform of the system of command was implemented, developed and prepared by the presidential administration, not the Ministry of National Defense.

¹⁸ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rjfUm6mbBv4>

¹⁹ Koziej S. (2015), Raport BBN: Zasady i procedury bezpieczeństwa przewozu powietrznego osób zajmujących ważne stanowiska państwowe, [in:]: Wybrane dokumenty oraz opracowania wydane przez biuro bezpieczeństwa narodowego w latach 2010-2015, Warszawa, pp. 121-136

With regard to security issues, Bronisław Komorowski focused on those that were closest to his heart since the time he was the Minister of National Defense, i.e. the army. His initiative gave rise to the so-called Komorowski doctrine, a change in the approach towards the Armed Forces for which the priority was to defend the country rather than maintain expeditionary capabilities²⁰, a reform of the system that managed the country's defense and, mentioned here, the reform of the system of command of the Armed Forces in Poland. Two documents prepared by the presidential administration concerned security in cyberspace (including the doctrine of Poland cybersecurity). Hence, we may be talking about managing security rather than measures that are *strictly* strategic. They can only include the decision about purchasing "Patriot" missiles for the air defense program "Wista," much-heralded as a Polish anti-missile shield, whose implementation was nevertheless spread over many years, involving many governments and presidents.

Undoubtedly, the success of B. Komorowski is his efficient lobbying for the so-called NATO Response Force, the forces capable of immediate response with certain elements that should be ready to act within two or three days in case of crisis. The decision to launch them was taken during the NATO summit in 2014 followed by an announcement that the next meeting of the heads of NATO member states shall take place in Warsaw.

The objectives and the practical implementation of Bronisław Komorowski's security policy focus more on managing security during relatively stable times, established membership in international organizations. It is the time of develo-

ping documents and sector strategies, a reform of the Armed Forces and implementation of long-term modernization programs.

The security situation in the region at the time when Andrzej Duda assumed his position was completely different from the one in 2010. The war in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas), which began in 2014, against separatists supported by the Russian army changed the attitude of the West towards the Russian Federation. Members of the EU and NATO recognized this event as a breach of the agreements in force, including the one most important from the point of view of Poland, the agreement of 1997²¹, which obligated NATO to withhold from deploying any troops or military installations on the territories of new member states.

The change of approach to Russia in the West, including admitting in public that its offensive policy may threaten NATO, opened up for Poland new opportunities to lobby for the physical presence of NATO troops on the territory of Poland. The success in this case, and appearance of 3000 component can be at least partially attributed to the president who supported the process and lobbied for it. The 2016 NATO summit, during which the decision about deployment of troops in the Central European countries was announced, was undoubtedly a breakthrough and changed the policy of the whole Alliance in the context of defense strategies and threat prioritization. However, it needs to be said that the guarantees obtained are costly and we will be paying them off for many years by purchasing the Patriot missiles for "Wista" system from the American producer. Only

²⁰ Doktryna Komorowskiego (2015), [in:] Wybrane dokumenty oraz opracowania wydane przez biuro bezpieczeństwa narodowego w latach 2010-2015, Warszawa 2015, pp. 96-98.

²¹ Akt Stanowiący o podstawach wzajemnych stosunków, współpracy i bezpieczeństwa signed by NATO and Russian Federation on May 27, 1997 in Paris. At the time president Boris Yeltsin was invited to the special summit of NATO. The document was to be a "road map" of the future cooperation between NATO and Russia.

the first phase of the program is to cost over 16 billion zlotys²².

The change of perspective of the national security challenges, including their location (not in the Middle East, but just near Poland's borders), was also at the core of the decision to develop a new type of armed forces - the Territorial Defense Force. In the political discourse often called the private army of the Minister of National Defense, Antoni Macierewicz, for whom launching and developing the TDF was an absolute priority, was tied to the government and not president's activity, as he, to say the least, distanced himself from the Territorial Defense Forces; assuming a similar approach to most of the issues connected with the functioning of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. The reform of the system of command and control of the country defense has been developed by the Ministry of National Defense and the cooperation between Klonowa St. (MND's headquarters) and the Presidential Palace failed to improve even when the minister was replaced.

The objectives and the practical implementation of Andrzej Duda's security policy focus more on the tactical than the strategic measures based on tight cooperation with the allies, particularly with the United States, and obtaining additional security guarantees from them (for example physical presence on the territory of Poland). With half of his term gone, it is hard to notice any other key decisions or activities of the president in the field of national defense. Instead, the president has been actively participating (supporting, refraining from vetoing) in the issues connected with internal security, such as "*deubekizacja*" of the Police force (which means removing officers who

served in the Ministry of Public Security during the time of the People's Republic of Poland), courts reform or, particularly popular during the 2015 election campaign, issues connected with accepting refugees in Poland.

Summary

The security policy of the Polish presidents after 1989 was implemented in line with their constitutional powers and responsibilities. Because it was mostly connected with foreign policy, international relations and the global line-up of power in Europe and around the world, those factors determined its intensity as well as successes and failures.

Without negating the involvement of Lech Wałęsa and Aleksander Kwaśniewski in the processes of integrating with the West, without the West deciding to enlarge those two organizations, it would have been hard to succeed in this respect. This is quite obvious considering the fiasco of the new EU Eastern Policy proposed by Lech Kaczyński, which was not accepted by the key members of the old UE.

The first 15 years of the discussed period were characterized by the lack of other alternatives for the chosen direction to ensure security through integration; there was no significant power in Poland that would be able to negate this direction successfully, though parties such as Polish People's Party (PSL), Samoobrona, partially SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) built their political capital basing on the anti-EU sentiments and objecting to operations carried out under the wings of NATO. Despite that, both presidents could count on the support of the government and parliament when it came to the efforts aimed at integration with the Western structures.

²² <https://www.defence24.pl/wisla-i-patrioty-za-475-mld-dolarow-kontrakt-podpisany>

When those great integration-related challenges were gone, presidents' policies lost their strategic character and started to focus on the organizational aspects, be it functioning of the Armed Forces and the security system in Bronisław Komorowski's case, or maintaining the interest of the United States (not selfless at all, though!) in supporting Poland's safety (Andrzej Duda). Accepting the fact that after a decade of expeditionary armies, the time has come to start protecting the borders as the priority responsibility of the Armed Forces, both presidents - more or less efficiently - have been managing security, rather than developing its strategic character.

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Legislation

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