

1. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS

POLAND AND ESTONIA AS ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES. SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS ON TERMINOLOGY AND ASYMMETRY OF RELATIONS

GRZEGORZ KOZŁOWSKI

ABSTRACT

DOI: 10.26410/SF_2/19/1

The article discusses asymmetric relationship of Poland and Estonia vis-à-vis the United States. It analyzes their: (a) legal; based on existing and formally binding international obligations upon US is a signatory, and (b) political; in terms of US attention and reassurances, position. The publications suggests that, while the formal stance of Warsaw and Tallinn vis-à-vis Washington is equal, their real position in the US policy seems to be different. Due to the size of the country, geo-political and geo-military location and the role of Polish diaspora in domestic policy of the US, Poland gets more attention and reassurances from the United States than Estonia. This is reflected in political, economic, and essentially military dimension, with a direct US engagement in building defence and deterrence capabilities of Poland. Such a political posture is petrified and depends almost exclusively on Washington decisions. Poland and Estonia has already exhausted their power to manoeuvre with strongly backing US policy and meeting requirements under NATO burden sharing. The paper is com

KEYWORDS

Alliance, asymmetry of relations, reassurances, burden sharing.

DR GRZEGORZ KOZŁOWSKI

grzegorz.kozlowski@msz.gov.pl

Ambassador of the Republic
of Poland to Estonia

Introduction

Poland and Estonia remain very close allies, sharing political and military priorities, threat perception and the common goals in the security and defence policy. Being the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, they have the same three distinctive features which could characterize

their behavior within the Alliance: borderline states, historical memory and the big attachment to the right of self-determination (Rodkiewicz, 2017, p. 133-134)¹. Simultaneously, they prioritize their relationship with

¹ Rodkiewicz wrote about Poland, but his description of features determining the position of Poland in the alliance could also be used in case of Estonia.

the United States as the foundation of their security guarantees. However, while the US is in the centre of the Polish and Estonian foreign and security policy, the position of these countries in American politics seems to be different and could be characterized by a diverse level of attention and reassurances from Washington vis-à-vis Warsaw and Tallinn.

1. Poland and Estonia as Allies of the United States.

Theory of international relations offers us a lot of definitions of an 'alliance' (Bergsmann, 2001, p. 25). One of the most widely accepted description was given by Stephen M. Walt who interpreted alliance as a "formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states" (Walt, 1990, p. 12). Such a broad definition embrace not only written, but also other forms of alliances since in some cases states could be reluctant to sign formal treaties (i.e. alliance between US and Israel).

US political documents do not necessarily give us a full picture on Washington's allies. The US National Security Strategy often uses that ('allies') term in the wider context of security relations of US. It stipulates that "allies and partners are a great strength of the United States. They add directly to US political, economic, military, intelligence, and other capabilities (...). None of our adversaries have comparable coalitions"². In selected areas of text the term 'ally' is dedicated to states; it refers i.e. to Korea, Thailand and Philippines. It also embraces NATO allies stating that "NATO alliance of free and sovereign states is one of our great advantages over competitors,

and the United States remains committed to art. V of the Washington Treaty³.

2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States describes mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships as crucial and "providing a durable, asymmetric advantage that no competitor or rival can match". The document identifies Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships and the Trans-Atlantic NATO alliance as priority of security relationship⁴. For some of experts terms 'allies' and 'partners' seem not to have any differences. Hans Binnendijk emphasizes that the US relies heavily on 'outer defense' composed of allies and coalition partners; later in this category he uses a one broader term 'partners' (Binnendijk, 2016, p. 3).

Hierarchy of US allies'.

First category of allies can be found in treaty obligations of the US. According to Article II, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States, the US President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur"⁵. The United States concluded both multilateral and bilateral treaty agreements, which we would fall into the category of alliances or as the US State Department describes them as 'US Collective Defense Arrangements'. Upon the current list of treaties in force, the US is a part of: Inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance (Rio Treaty), Security Treaty (ANZUS Pact), Southeast Asia collective defense treaty (SEATO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilateral mutual defense treaties with

³ Ibidem, p. 46 and 48.

⁴ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge.* p. 8-10 /in/ <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf> - access on Feb. 26, 2019. The document in full version is classified.

⁵ *The Constitution of the United States*, National Archives, Americas Founding Documents /in/ <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript> - access on Feb. 21, 2019.

² *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December, 2017, p. 37. /in/ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf> - access on Feb. 26, 2019.

Japan, Korea and Philippines. The form and the character of the alliance's obligations taken by the United States are shown below (see table 1 and 2).

Table 1. US Allies. Multilateral treaties.

Legal basis.	Commitment.	Allies.
Rio Treaty. Done, Sep. 2, 1947. Entered into force, Dec. 3, 1948.	Art 3.1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations ⁶ .	Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.
NATO. Signed, Apr. 4, 1949. Entered into force, Aug. 24, 1949.	The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area ⁷ .	Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom.
SEATO. Signed, Sep. 1954. Entered into force, Feb. 19, 1955.	Art IV.1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations ⁸ .	Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom.
ANZUS.	Art. IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes ⁹ .	Australia and New Zealand.

Source: United States Department of State, Treaties in Force. A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2018, Office of the Legal Adviser.

Table 2. US Allies. Bilateral treaties.

Legal basis.	Commitment.	Ally.
Treaty of mutual cooperation and security. Signed, Jan. 19, 1960, Entered into force, Jun. 23, 1960.	Art. V. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security ¹⁰ .	Japan

⁶ The Rio Treaty /in/ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad061.asp - access on Feb. 23, 2019.

⁷ The North Atlantic Treaty /in/ https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf - access on Feb. 25, 2019.

⁸ Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact); September 8, 1954. /in/ Yale Law School, op. cit. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp - Feb. 25, 2019.

⁹ Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS); September 1, 1951 /in/ Yale Law School, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy /in/ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu002.asp - access on FEB 23, 2019.

¹⁰ Treaty between the USA and Japan of Mutual Cooperation and Security /in/ <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html> - access on Feb. 26, 2019.

<p>Mutual defense treaty. Signed, Oct. 1, 1953. Entered into force, Nov. 17, 1954.</p>	<p>Art. III. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes¹¹.</p>	<p>Korea</p>
<p>Mutual defense treaty. Signed, Aug. 30, 1951. Entered into force, Aug. 27, 1952.</p>	<p>Art. IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security¹².</p>	<p>Philippines</p>

Source: United States Department of State, *Treaties in Force*. op. cit.

The other category of allies, ‘major non-NATO ally’, are sourced in the art. 22 par. 2321 k. of the US Code (‘Designation of major non-NATO allies’). This norm stipulates that 6 countries, including: Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand “shall be deemed” as major non-NATO allies. In this category we have two countries, Egypt and Israel, which do not have any other formal alliance with the US. Simultaneously, the President of the US can upon same paragraph designate “a country as a major non-NATO ally”¹³. Currently (par. 120.32) there are following countries – apart from 6 already mentioned – falling within this category: Afghanistan, Argentina, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Thailand and Tunisia. Additionally “Taiwan shall be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally”¹⁴ (see table 3).

Table 3. US Allies. Major non-NATO Allies

Legal basis.	Allies.
US Code.	<p>Initially recognized: Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. Later recognized: Afghanistan, Argentina, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Thailand and Tunisia.</p>

Source: US Code /in/ <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2321k> – access on Feb. 21, 2019.

The review of the legal basis of the allies of the United States allows us to interpret that there are 63 countries, which possess an ally status stemming from: multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties and US domestic law (Major-non NATO allies). NATO (with USA, Poland and Estonia as equal partners) seems to have an unique position due to at least four prerequisites.

First, NATO is considered as an international organization with separate personality under international law (Moelle, 2017, p. 72) and well established civilian and military command structure (Ismay, 1957). Simultaneously, there has been a general understanding among the member of NATO since 1949 that (unlike typical other alliances) the Alliance is not a regional arrangement or agency under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and “that the Alliance

¹¹ Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA and Republic of Korea /in/ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp - access on Feb. 26, 2019

¹² Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA and Philippines /in/ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp - access on Feb. 26, 2019.

¹³ The US Code /in/ <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2321k> – access on Feb. 21, 2019.

¹⁴ Ibidem.

is not subordinate to the Security Council, notably with respect to the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence under article 51”(Yost, 2007, p. 34).

Second, NATO has expanded its membership from initially 12 countries into the current state of 29¹⁵. Other US multilateral alliances have faced different turbulences; under the Rio Treaty, 6 states lost its membership (Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico and Venezuela). By decision of SEATO Council of September 24, 1975, the Organization ceased to exist as of June 30, 1977 (the collective defense treaty remains in force). ANZUS was also defragmented, since the United States suspended, as of September 17, 1986, obligations under the treaty as between the US and New Zealand¹⁶.

Third, there have been differences in using in practice alliances mechanisms. Less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NATO powers invoked, for the first time ever, Article 5 of the Alliance’s 1949 founding charter, stipulating that an attack on any member of the organization constituted an attack on all its members. With regard to other multilateral alliances faced different challenges. As Child wrote on Rio Treaty, “is incomplete and vague as a defensive alliance or a collective security system since it does not provide the military infrastructure and established no military organs 17 invocations of the Rio Treaty between 1947 and 1983 that it has never been employed as defensive alliance against an outside threat”(Child, 1983, p. 9).

Fourth, there is a direct and indirect reference to NATO in US strategic documents

as the foundation of security and symbol of the alliance. It is mentioned – as the only multilateral organization of that type - in the National Security Strategy of the United States as the center of gravity of security relationship with Europe. Similar reference can be found in the National Defense Strategy, which stipulates that fortifying the Transatlantic NATO Alliance remains one of the priorities¹⁷. In addition, a special category of ally (‘Major non-NATO ally’) was created as a point of reference to NATO and not to the other alliance.

2. Asymmetric relations between Poland and US and Estonia and US¹⁸.

Poland and Estonia prioritize the relationship with the US in their foreign and security policy (Biehl, Giegerich, Jonas, 2013). They consistently view transatlantic cooperation as the most important factor in providing European security, seeking extensive bilateral and regional cooperation with the United States with the aim of reinforcing the stability and development of Euro-Atlantic area. Warsaw and Tallinn perceive security element in this relationships as broad as possible, including energy (especially Poland: the role of US LNG in building security energy in the Central and Eastern European market) and economic area.

The unique position of the US in the policy of Poland and Estonia has bipartisan stance, being reflected in the legal and political documents of both countries. The National Security Concept of Estonia stipulates that “good relations between Estonia and the United States strengthen transatlantic cooperation, reinforcing the stability and development of the Euro-Atlantic area

¹⁷ *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁸ Please see one of the significant examples of literature in this matter: James D. Morrow, *Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security*, International Organization Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 207-233.

¹⁵ France was not a part of the military Alliance between 1967 and 2015

¹⁶ United States Department of State, *Treaties in Force. A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2018*, Office of the Legal Adviser, p. 507-512 /in/ <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/282222.pdf> – access on Feb. 26, 2019.

(...) Estonia seeks to advance extensive bilateral cooperation with the United States in all areas of importance, enhancing dialogue on different levels"¹⁹. This position has been constantly reiterated by the Government of Estonia both on multilateral and bilateral fora, as former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia Sven Mikser said at his last expose "the leading role of the United States of America in ensuring NATO's deterrence and protection (...) continue to be necessary"²⁰.

Polish National Security Strategy positions the United States as "the most important non-European ally of Poland with a key significance for the security of the Republic of Poland". It places the US as one of three (also NATO and EU) pillars of security of Poland²¹. In 2019 Minister of Foreign Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz underlined that "Poland has consequently been strengthening the strategic partnership with the United States, the key ally in NATO"²². The same tone on the relations between Poland and the US was taken by previous PL governments regardless the political parties composing the Cabinet²³.

Burden Sharing

The alliance between great powers and weaker states feature an asymmetric exchange of goods. The former, like the US, provides security for the alliance, while the latter, like Poland and Estonia could provide "autonomy" to the great power. This autonomy could take a number of forms,

from general backing for its foreign policy to different forms of military or economic support (i.e. readiness to hosting great power's military bases; Blankenship, 2018, p. 15-16), opening also a question of a burden sharing in the alliance.

The United States has allocated for the defense of NATO vast majority of financial sources, allowing for many decades other allies, mostly smaller ones, to free ride. It was especially visible under the NATO doctrine of Mutual Assured Reaction Strategy (Olson, Zeckhauser, 1966), which stated in par. 3 b. that (to successfully defend Europe against Soviet military aggression) "in the event of aggression they (Soviets) will be subjected immediately to devastating counter-attack employing atomic weapons"²⁴. The nuclear umbrella by the US kept the security of the whole alliance, leaving the other members to de facto free ride. The scale of this dependency has been changing, but no one could question that the security of European allies still deeply depend on US capabilities. Washington allocates for defense 70 % of resources of all NATO allies (see table 6).

¹⁹ *National Security Concept of Estonia*, adopted by Riigikogu on May 12, 2010, p. 11.

²⁰ *The Presentation of the Government*, Foreign Policy Debate, Riigikogu, Feb. 12, 2019 (handout).

²¹ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 2014, /in/ https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/NSS_RP.pdf - access on May, 27, 2019.

²² *Minister Czaputowicz o priorytetach polskiej dyplomacji w 2019* /in/ <https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/minister-jacek-czaputowicz-o-priorytetach-polskiej-dyplomacji-w-2019-roku> - access on May 27, 2019.

²³ *Exposé Ministrów Spraw Zagranicznych 1990-2013*, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Biuro Archiwum i Zarządzania Informacją, Warszawa 2013.

²⁴ North Atlantic Military Committee, Decision on MC 48, A Report by the Military Committee on The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years, 22 November 1954 /in/ <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a541122a.pdf> - access on May 29, 2019.

Table 3. Level of defence spending of NATO Allies (2017-2018).

	Country	Defence spending (in Millions of USD – current prices)		Share of defence spending among all NATO countries (%)	
		2017e ²⁵	2018e	2017e	2018e
1.	USA	685,957	706,063	71,55	69,67
2.	UK	55,344	61,508	5,77	6,07
3.	France	46,036	52,025	4,80	5,13
4.	Germany	45,580	51,009	4,75	5,03
5.	Italy	23,852	25,780	2,48	2,54
6.	Canada	22,467	21,601	2,34	2,13
7.	Turkey	12,972	15,219	1,35	1,50
8.	Spain	11,864	13,863	1,23	1,37
9.	Poland	9,935	12,088	1,04	1,19
10.	The Netherlands	9,788	13,023	1,02	1,28
11.	Norway	6,463	7,266	0,67	0,72
12.	Greece	4,748	5,004	0,49	0,49
13.	Belgium	4,504	5,114	0,47	0,50
14.	Denmark	3,780	4,376	0,39	0,43
15.	Romania	3,643	4,835	0,38	0,47
16.	Portugal	2,702	3,320	0,28	0,33
17.	Czech Rep.	2,255	2,821	0,24	0,28
18.	Hungary	1,468	1,733	0,15	0,17
19.	Slovakia	1,053	1,320	0,11	0,13
20.	Lithuania	816	1,062	0,08	0,11
21.	Bulgaria	723	1,014	0,07	0,10
22.	Croatia	698	799	0,07	0,08
23.	Estonia	540	637	0,06	0,06
24.	Latvia	512	701	0,05	0,07
25.	Slovenia	476	567	0,04	0,05
26.	Luxembourg	325	391	0,03	0,04
27.	Albania	144	179	0,01	0,02
28.	Montenegro	66	87	0,01	0,01
29.	Iceland	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
30.	Overall	958,711	1,013,406	1	1

Source: Communiqué PR/CP(2018)091, Defence Expenditure of NATO countries (2011-2018), 10 July 2018, NATO Documents.

The US has always wanted to convince Europeans to spend more for defense²⁶. This pressure has been intensifying under the administration of President Donald Trump, who put a burden sharing as the key priority in the US policy vis-à-vis NATO members.

Art. 3 of the Brussels Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Govern-

²⁵ e-estimates.

²⁶ See Senat Resolution 570, *Emphasizing the Importance of Meeting NATO Spending Commitments*, Congressional Record Senate, July 2018. in- <https://www.congress.gov/crec/2018/07/10/CREC-2018-07-10-pt1-PgS4878.pdf> - access, Jan 13 2019.

ment participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussel 11-12 July 2018²⁷ confirmed the commitments “to all aspects of the Defence Investment Pledge” agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit. That includes expectations from the Member States to keep defence expenditures on the level of at least of 2 % of their Gross Domestic Product, including at least 20 % for major equipment.

²⁷ Press Release (2018) 074, 11 July 2018, /in/ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm

Table 4. Level of defence spending & their share in the GDP of NATO Allies (2017-2018)

	Country	Share of defence spending in GDP (%)		Share of military expenditure spent on military equipment (%)	
		2017e	2018e	2017e	2018e
1.	USA	3,57	3,50	28,43	26,81
2.	Greece	2,38	2,27	15,47	12,40
3.	UK	2,11	2,10	22,03	21,68
4.	Estonia	2,08	2,14	19,22	18,15
5.	Poland	1,89	1,98	22,04	23,95
6.	France	1,78	1,81	24,17	23,66
7.	Lithuania	1,73	1,96	31,61	28,88
8.	Romania	1,72	1,93	33,20	34,69
9.	Latvia	1,69	2,00	19,57	31,58
10.	Norway	1,55	1,61	24,70	26,77
11.	Turkey	1,52	1,68	30,60	31,55
12.	Montenegro	1,38	1,58	4,89	9,66
13.	Canada	1,36	1,23	11,02	17,61
14-15	Bulgaria	1,27	1,56	8,10	28,86
	Croatia	1,27	1,30	7,53	13,25
16-17	Germany	1,24	1,24	13,75	14,13
	Portugal	1,24	1,36	10,02	12,97
18-19	Denmark	1,16	1,21	10,39	13,43
	The Netherlands	1,16	1,35	16,80	24,93
20.	Italy	1,15	1,15	20,68	21,12
21.	Albania	1,11	1,19	6,96	10,72
22.	Slovakia	1,10	1,20	17,74	21,05
23.	Hungary	1,05	1,08	15,34	15,08
24.	Czech Rep.	1,04	1,11	11,12	12,39
25.	Slovenia	0,98	1,01	4,04	8,22
26.	Belgium	0,91	0,93	6,41	8,20
27.	Spain	0,90	0,93	20,39	23,04
28.	Luxembourg	0,52	0,55	42,06	41,03
29.	Iceland	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Communique PR/CP(2018)091, Defence Expenditure of NATO countries (2011-2018), 10 July 2018, NATO Documents.

Only three countries fully meet NATO financial requirements (US, Greece and UK). Poland and Estonia are in fact also in the club with respectively 1.98 and 2.14 % as a share of defence spending in GDP and 18.15 and 23.95 as a share of military expenditure dedicated to major equipment. Warsaw and Tallinn clearly understand that they have to meet the expectations from the US, if they aspire to get the political and military reassurances from Washington.

Asymmetry and reassurances

Poland and Estonia as junior partners of the US, struggle to manage the risk on be-

coming, on one hand, entrapped in American security engagements, and, on the other hand, abandoned by the US while seeking greater autonomy (Endvall, 2017, p. 16). They both seek and expect from Washington as much attention and reassurance as possible, but their positions in the US policy seem to be different²⁸. To describe that differences we need to start with identifying the diverse degree of asymmetry between Poland and US and between

²⁸ The aim of this paper is not looking very deeply into the matter of the relationship; that would require an analysis of the "secondary alliance" dilemma. See - Glenn H. Snyder, *The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics*, World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, 1984, p. 466-468.

Estonia and US²⁹.

Most of the theories interpret asymmetry as an imbalance of capacities and power, a disequilibrium that creates either subordination or a competition for domination. The author of the asymmetric theory Professor Brantley Womack asserts that states in an asymmetric relationships are usually viewed as similar actors, plus or minus the disparity in capacities (Firsting, 2010, p. 27). The most visible asymmetries can be reflected in military terms, and less so economically, diplomatically or institutionally (Long, 2017, p. 146).

An issue of power is thoroughly analyzed by Pfetsch and Landau who described it as „the capacity to move somebody in a direction he would not have chosen without the interference of somebody”. According to them, there are at least three dimensions of power which can be expressed: power-as-a- possession (Thomas Hobbes’ school measured mostly by economic resources and military capacities, but also other factors like resources, population or diplomatic skills), power-as-a-relation (John Locke school: power is the result of a comparison of actions between two actors) and power-as-relativity (Karl Deutsch: the amount of power and actor possesses depends on the amount of power another has; Pfetsch, Landau, 2000, p. 27-28).

The fact of asymmetry among US, the only superpower in the world, Poland, a country aspires to be a subregional power (a leader of Central and Eastern Europe), and Estonia, one of the smallest member of NATO and EU, does not require broader analysis. In every above mentioned method of analysis differences of potential of states, determinants of power of US, Poland and Estonia should be enormously different.

We can however present selected data regarding economy and military power of three countries.

**Table 5. Potential of US, Poland and Estonia.
Selected measures**

Measure	USA	Poland	Estonia
GDP (bln USD)	19,490.0	524.8	26.0
GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity)	59,800 USD	29,600 USD	31,700 USD
Export (bln USD)	1,553.0	224.6	13,4
Population (mln)	329.3	38.4	1.3
Area (1000 square m.)	9,833.5	312.6	45.2
Defence expenditures (in mln USD)	706.063	12.088	637
Armed Forces (thousands)	1,314.0	118	6.1
Expenditures on Education (% PKB)	5.0	4.9	5.5

Sources: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/re-sources/the-world-factbook/geos/en.html>
– access on Feb. 23, 2019, and Communiqué PR/CP(2018)091, Defence Expenditures of NATO countries (2011-2018), 10 July 2018, NATO Documents.

Selected data prove big differences among the countries, especially visible in defense and economic area. Differences in asymmetry of relations could transmit to different level of attention and reassurances from the US to Poland and Estonia. As Blankenship wrote, there might be several forms of reassurances made by dominated ally (US) vis-à-vis dependent allies (Poland and Estonia) including: symbolic assurances (i.e. verbal promises and diplomatic visits), joint military exercises, troop deployments, mechanisms for allied consultations and assistance (i.e. arms sales or aid; Blankenship, p. 21-23).

²⁹ To understand arms vs. allies relations please see: James D. Morrow, *Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security*, International Organization Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 207-233.

Political elements of asymmetric relations between US and Poland & US and Estonia.

Poland is for the United States "a stalwart ally in Central Europe and one of the United States' strongest partners on the continent in fostering security and prosperity regionally, throughout Europe, and the world. The United States and Poland partner closely on NATO capabilities, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, missile defense, human rights, economic growth and innovation, energy security, and regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe"³⁰. During the recent visit of President Donald Trump to Poland in July 2017 he said that US and Poland "share a special bond forged by unique histories and national characters", identifying Poland as a committed member of NATO and a "leading nation of Europe"³¹.

Estonia is also perceived by US through NATO lenses; "the United States and Estonia are strong allies and partners (...) Estonia is an effective and reliable trans-Atlantic partner in advancing peace, stability, and democracy in Europe and beyond. Its cooperation with the region has made it an invaluable ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)"³². As President Obama referred many time during his speech in Tallinn to the security and prosperity of the Baltic States and their resistance to the threats from the East³³.

³⁰ Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *US Relations with Poland*, April, 25, 2018 /in/ <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2875.htm> - access on Feb. 27, 2019.

³¹ *Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland*, July 6, 2017, Warsaw /in/ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-people-poland/> - access on Feb. 27, 2019.

³² Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *US Relations with Estonia*, April, 12, 2018 /in/ <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5377.htm> - access on Feb. 27, 2019.

³³ *Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia*, September 3rd, 2014, Tallinn /in/ <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obama-people-estonia> - access on Feb. 27, 2019.

While Poland is the leading state in the Central and Eastern Europe, Estonia can be perceived as the small, the most far north-eastern European ally of the United States. The consequences of differences in size of the countries ("size matters") could be characterized on at least four dimensions, stemming mostly from the huge differences in the sizes of countries ("size matters"). First, Poland – unlike Estonia - has developed with the US relatively mature mechanism of bilateral consultations, including: Strategic Dialogue, Strategic Consultative Cooperation Group and Democratization Dialogue. These three different formats of talks on vice-ministerial level on political and military issues gathered usually every year. Second, dialogue on the highest political level is done by Poland on bilateral level, while Estonia has "Baltic" formats of meeting, meaning that US prefers to use multilateral channel of communication (US-3 Baltic States³⁴). That could be reflected – among other issues - by number of the high level visit, which is a part of diplomatic ritual and a matter of attention (see table 5).

Table 6. High Level Bilateral Estonian-US and Polish-US visits (years 2014-2019)

I. High Level Estonian-US visits.	
President	Barack Obama – 2014, Tallinn Kersti Kaljulaid – 2018, Washington (together with Presidents of Latvia and Lithuania).
Vice President/Prime Minister	Mike Pence – 2017, Tallinn (together with Presidents of Latvia and Lithuania)
Secretary of State/Minister of Foreign Affairs	Sven Mikser – 2018, Washington (together with Foreign Ministers of Latvia and Lithuania).
II. High Level Polish-US visits.	
President	Barack Obama – 2014, 2016, Warsaw Donald Trump – 2017, Warsaw Andrzej Duda – 2016, 2018, Washington
Vice President/Prime Minister	Joe Biden – 2014, Warsaw Mike Pence – 2017, Tallinn

³⁴ See e.g. Baltic Summit in Washington, April, 4th, 2018.

Secretary of State/Minister of Foreign Affairs	Grzegorz Schetyna – 2015, Washington John Kerry – 2016, Warsaw Witold Waszczykowski – 2017, Washington Rex Tillerson – 2018, Warsaw Jacek Czaputowicz – 2018, 2019, Washington
--	--

Source: Materials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

Third, Polish diaspora in the US amounts to 10 million people, which might have a significant influence on US domestic policy. That factor was especially present during the recent presidential campaign³⁵, but also can play in Congress³⁶. Fourth, geopolitical and geostrategic location Poland determines a special position of this country in political, military economic terms. In specific circumstances, Warsaw could even play a role of a broker in supporting the US in managing global politics; hosting of the Middle East Conference in Warsaw (February 14, 2019, Warsaw) could be one of the primary examples.

Legal elements of asymmetric relations between US and Poland & US and Estonia.

Poland and Estonia has developed relatively major legal infrastructure with the US, based mostly on two prerequisites: the US engagement in assisting the former Soviet bloc countries in political and economic transformation and NATO membership. That allows both of these countries to conclude several bilateral treaties with the US including (i.e.) agreements concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program (with Estonia – 1992; with Poland – 1991) or agreements regarding

grants under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (with Estonia – 1993; with Poland – 1993)³⁷. However, the privileged (in terms of additional reassurances) position of Poland is created with the US plans to military engage in this country. There are at least two important documents regarding these plans: i. Agreement on the Status of armed forces of the United States of America in the territory of the Republic of Poland (signed at Warsaw in 2009); so called “SOFA Supplemental Agreement” (as a supplementary agreement to NATO SOFA treaty); ii. Declaration on Safeguarding Freedom, Building Prosperity through Poland-US Strategic Partnership (signed at Washington in 2018), which reaffirms the commitment of US and Poland to art. 5 of the Washington Treaty and confirming the interests of both countries to strategic partnership. The first document secures legal framework for significant presence of US troops in Poland. The latter is an additional mechanism to ensure Poland about the security guarantees; although only politically binding, but especially vital since “the language in the US alliance treaties is universally vague, and leaves loopholes such that policymakers can avoid being forced to intervene” (Blankenship, p. 20). Estonia (as well as the other Baltic states) possesses such a reassurance only to limited extent. In the Declaration to Celebrate 100 Years of Independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Renewed Partnership we can read that the US, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania “reaffirm their ironclad commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty”³⁸.

³⁷ State Department, *Treaties in Force*, op. cit.

³⁸ *Declaration to Celebrate 100 Years of Independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Renewed Partnership*, April 4, Washington DC, April 4 /in/ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/declaration-celebrate-100-years-independence-estonia-latvia-lithuania-renewed-partnership/> - access on March 26, 2019.

³⁵ See e.g. *Trump wouldn't win without Polish Americans*. /in/ <http://dziennikzwiazkowy.com/news-in-english/trump-wouldnt-win-without-polish-americans-an-interview-with-william-bill-ciosek/> - access on March, 26.

³⁶ PL-American Caucus is one of the largest in the US Congress.

Military elements of asymmetric relations between US and Poland & US and Estonia.

One of the most visible difference in the position of Poland and Estonia for the US is military presence of US forces. They are the part of NATO Military Presence in Poland (Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, NATO Units in Bydgoszcz, Enhanced Forward Presence in Orzysz with US 3rd Squadron and 2nd Cavalry Regiment, NATO Counter Intelligence Center of Excellence in Krakow), but also active bilaterally. That includes presence of: 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division with headquarters in Zagan and subordinate battalions in Bolesławiec, Skwierzyna and Świetoszów, Rotational Logistics and Aviation elements in Powidz, Mission Command Element in Poznan and 52nd Fighter Wing in Łask³⁹. In addition there are two big projects on the way: Missile Defence base in Redzikowo and a potential expansion of US presence as the discussion between Polish Ministry of National Defense and Pentagon are under way⁴⁰. Altogether there are over 4.000 US troops with a perspective of an expansion.

Simultaneously there are no US troops present in Estonia (discussion upon the Baltic Summit declaration is going on), except those who participate in the military exercises. The reasons of these differences in reassurances are several. First, in Estonia as well in Poland, there is NATO battalion as an Enhanced Forward Presence, but the composition of Allies in this contingent is different (headed by UK with rotational presence

of Denmark, France and Belgium). Second, the military doctrine in terms of attack would favor Poland as a better location for defense. As it was written by Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment experts "Poland's geographic depth would leave US forces there less vulnerable to an initial salvo by Russian area-denial capabilities than if they were positioned in the Baltic states" (Fabian, Gunzinger, van Tol, Cohn, Evans, 2019, p. 19). That argument is not usable in terms of a potential deterring role of US forces in Estonia. And third, the defense economic interconnection is much broader in Poland than in Estonia. It again is connected with the size of the country (and the US engagement in the Polish defense industry plans), since both of the countries are paying at least 2% of GDP for defense as it is expected by the US; in nominal terms difference in military budget is enormous (see table 4).

Economic elements of asymmetric relations between US and Poland & US and Estonia.

The data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) show that Poland has attracted more US investment than any other country of Central and Eastern Europe⁴¹. According to BEA (there are differences in methodology in US and PL statistics) the US companies had invested (by 2017) 12.6 billion USD. Simultaneously, Estonia attracted 71 million of US investments⁴². The same differences of scale can be seen in trade statistics (see table 5).

³⁹ *NATO-US Military Presence in Poland*, US Embassy in Warsaw, 2017 /in/ https://pl.usembassy.gov/nato_us/ - access on March 27, 2019.

⁴⁰ Proposal for a US Permanent Presence in Poland, Ministry of National Defence of Poland, 2018 /in/ <https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Proposal-for-a-U.S.-Permanent-Presence-in-Poland-2018.pdf> - access on March 27, 2019.

⁴¹ *American Investments in Poland*. KPMG, American Chamber of Commerce in Poland, April 2018, p. 25 /in/ https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pl/pdf/2018/04/pl-raport-polska-ameryka_eng-online.pdf - access on March 27, 2019.

⁴² Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Direct Investment by Country and Industry*, US Department of Commerce, July 2018 /in/ <https://www.bea.gov/news/2018/direct-investment-country-and-industry-2017> - access on March 27, 2019.

Table 7. US trade volume with Estonia and Poland in 2015-2017 (in mln USD).

USA	Poland			Estonia		
	2017	2016	2015	2017	2016	2015
Export (rank)	4,523.5 (44)	3,657.7 (47)	3,715.4 (47)	274 (118)	256.6 (120)	288.1 (113)
Import (rank)	7,106.0 (39)	5,960.5 (40)	5,637.9 (40)	604.4 (84)	1,011.1 (75)	503.5 (88)

Source: mine on https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/ft900_index.html

These statistics cannot be surprise since there is a difference of sizes of countries. However, they are also connected with two important factors directly attached to the security of both countries. There are big US defense industry companies (see point above) present, especially in aviation sector (i.e. United Technology Corporation). What is more, Poland started import US LNG (to LNG terminal in Swinoujście) what creates additional factor in energy security area.

Conclusions

Based on multilateral and bilateral treaties as well as domestic law, the US have over 60 allies. The position of Poland and Estonia is privileged since both of them are members of NATO, the strongest in the world military alliance, being anchored in the centre of US foreign and security policy. While the legal and formal position is analogous, there are differences for Poland and Estonia in the scope of asymmetry of their relationship with the US. Due to the size of the country, geo-political and geo-military location and the role of Polish diaspora in domestic policy of the US, Poland seems to get more attention and reassurances from the United States. That has consequences on: political (i.e. mature mechanism of bilateral consultations and relatively high level US attention measured in high number of visits), legal (framework of agreements dedicated to strengthened US military presence in Poland), economic (quantified in macr-

oeconomic terms) and military (US troops and facilities on the Poland's territory) front. Current posture of Poland and Estonia in the US policy can hardly be considered to change. Washington has strong allies in those capitals regardless the composition of governing coalitions and their financial obligations under NATO guidelines are petrified in accordance with US position.

References

- Biehl H., Giegerich B., Jonas A., *Strategic Cultures in Europe. Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent*, Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2013.
- Binnendijk H., *Friends, Foes, and Future Directions. US Partnerships in a Turbulent World*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2016.
- Blankenship B.D., *Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances*, Columbia University, New York, 2018.
- Child J., *The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict and Inter-Alliance Peacekeeping*. Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1983.
- HDP. Envall, *Japan: From Passive Partner to Active Ally*, /in/ Mi. Wesley (ed) Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, ANU Press.
- Fabian B., Gunzinger M., J. van Tol, Cohn J., Evans G., *Strengthening the Defense of NATO's Eastern Frontier*, CSBA, Washington, 2019, p. 19.
- Firsting S.T., *Assessing Asymmetry in International Politics: US-South Africa Relations: 1994-2008*. University of South Africa, Nov. 2010.
- Lord Ismay, *The First Five Years, 1949-1954*, Brussels, 1957.
- Long T., *It's not the size, it's the relationship: from small states to asymmetry*. International Politics, 54 (2), March, 2017.
- McCalla R., *NATO's Persistence After the Cold War*, International Organization, vol. 50, no 3, Summer 1996.
- Moritz P. Moelle, *The International Responsibility of International Organisations*. Co-

- operation in Peacekeeping Operation*, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- James D. Morrow, *Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security*, International Organization Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 207-233.
- Olson M., Zeckhauser R., *An economic theory of Alliances*, „Review of Economics and Statistics”1966, nr 48, s. 266-279.
- Pfetsch R., Landau A., *Symmetry and Asymmetry in International Negotiations*, *International Negotiations 5*: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.
- Reiter E., Gaertner H., *Small States and Alliances*, Physica Verlag, 2001.
- Rodkiewicz W., *Poland as an Ally*, /in/ M. Wesley, *Global Allies: Comparing US Allies in the XXI Century*, ANU Press, 2017.
- Snyder G.H., *The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics*, *World Politics*, vol. 36, no. 4, 1984, p. 466-468.
- David S. Yost, *NATO and International Organizations*, NATO Defense College, September 2007, Rome.
- Walt S.M., *The Origins of the Alliance*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1990.
- Wesley M., *Global Allies: Comparing US Allies in the XXI Century*, ANU Press, 2017.
- ## Documents
- American Investments in Poland*. KPMG, American Chamber of Commerce in Poland, April 2018, p. 25 /in/ https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pl/pdf/2018/04/pl-raport-polska-ameryka_eng-online.pdf – access on March 27, 2019.
- Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Direct Investment by Country and Industry*, US Department of Commerce, July 2018 /in/ <https://www.bea.gov/news/2018/direct-investment-country-and-industry-2017> – access on March 27, 2019.
- Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *US Relations with Poland*, April, 25, 2018 /in/ <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2875.htm> – access on Feb. 27, 2019.
- Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, *US Relations with Estonia*, April, 12, 2018 /in/ <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5377.htm> – access on Feb. 27, 2019.
- Communiqué PR/CP(2018)091, *Defence Expenditure of NATO countries (2011-2018)*, 10 July 2018, NATO Documents.
- Declaration to Celebrate 100 Years of Independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and Renewed Partnership*, April 4, Washington DC, April 4 /in/ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/declaration-celebrate-100-years-independence-estonia-latvia-lithuania-renewed-partnership/> – access on March 26, 2019.
- Exposé Ministrów Spraw Zagranicznych 1990-2013*, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Biuro Archiwum i Zarządzania Informacją, Warszawa 2013.
- Military's Competitive Edge*. p. 8-10 /in/ <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf> – access on Feb. 26, 2019. The document in full version is classified. *National Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA and Republic of Korea* /in/ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp – access on Feb. 26, 2019.
- Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA and Philippines* /in/ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp – access on Feb. 26, 2019.
- National Security Concept of Estonia*, adopted by Riigikogu on May 12, 2010.
- National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2014*, /in/ https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/01/NSS_RP.pdf – access on May, 27, 2019.
- NATO-US Military Presence in Poland*, US Embassy in Warsaw, 2017 /in/ https://pl.usembassy.gov/nato_us/ – access on March 27, 2019.
- North Atlantic Military Committee, Decision on MC 48, *A Report by the Military Committee on The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years*, 22 November 1954 /in/ <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a541122a.pdf> – access on May 29, 2019.

- Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia*, September 3rd, 2014, Tallinn /in/ <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-obama-people-estonia> - access on Feb. 27, 2019.
- Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland*, July 6, 2017, Warsaw /in/ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-people-poland/> - access on Feb. 27, 2019.
- Press Release* (2018) 074, 11 July 2018, /in/ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm
- Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December, 2017 /in/ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf> - access on Feb. 26, 2019.
- Proposal for a US Permanent Presence in Poland*, Ministry of National Defence of Poland, 2018 /in/ <https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Proposal-for-a-U.S.-Permanent-Presence-in-Poland-2018.pdf> - access on March 27, 2019.
- Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS); September 1, 1951 /in/ Yale Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact); September 8, 1954. /in/ Yale Law School, op. cit. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp - Feb. 25, 2019.
- Law School, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy /in/ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu002.asp - access on Feb 23, 2019.
- Senat Resolution 570, *Emphasizing the Importance of Meeting NATO Spending Commitments*, Congressional Record Senate, July 2018. in- <https://www.congress.gov/crec/2018/07/10/CREC-2018-07-10-pt1-PgS4878.pdf> - access, Jan 13 2019. *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Sharpening the American*
- The Constitution of the United States*, National Archives, Americas Founding Documents /in/ <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript> - access on Feb. 21, 2019.
- The North Atlantic Treaty /in/ https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf - access on Feb. 25, 2019.
- The Presentation of the Government*, Foreign Policy Debate, Riigikogu, Feb. 12, 2019 (handout).
- The Rio Treaty* /in/ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad061.asp - access on Feb. 23, 2019.
- Treaty between the USA and Japan of Mutual Cooperation and Security /in/ <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html> - access on Feb. 26, 2019.
- The US Code /in/ <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2321k> - access on Feb. 21, 2019.
- United States Department of State, *Treaties in Force. A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2018*, Office of the Legal Adviser, p. 507-512 /in/ <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/282222.pdf> - access on Feb. 26, 2019.

About the authors

Dr. Grzegorz Kozłowski, Born in Warsaw in 1974. Diplomat, lawyer and economist, PhD in Economics at the Warsaw School of Economics. Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Estonia since Feb. 2018. General research interests: international relations, defence, economics.